2bfb82b Merge pull request #351 06aeea5 Turn secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize outlen to in/out 970164d Merge pull request #348 6466625 Improvements for coordinate decompression e2100ad Merge pull request #347 8e48787 Change secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine's count argument to size_t. c69dea0 Clear output in more cases for pubkey_combine, adds tests. 269d422 Comment copyediting. b4d17da Merge pull request #344 4709265 Merge pull request #345 26abce7 Adds 32 static test vectors for scalar mul, sqr, inv. 5b71a3f Better error case handling for pubkey_create & pubkey_serialize, more tests. 3b7bc69 Merge pull request #343 eed87af Change contrib/laxder from headers-only to files compilable as standalone C d7eb1ae Merge pull request #342 7914a6e Make lax_der_privatekey_parsing.h not depend on internal code 73f64ff Merge pull request #339 9234391 Overhaul flags handling 1a36898 Make flags more explicit, add runtime checks. 1a3e03a Merge pull request #340 96be204 Add additional tests for eckey and arg-checks. bb5aa4d Make the tweak function zeroize-output-on-fail behavior consistent. 4a243da Move secp256k1_ec_privkey_import/export to contrib. 1b3efc1 Move secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_recover into the recovery module. e3cd679 Eliminate all side-effects from VERIFY_CHECK() usage. b30fc85 Avoid nonce_function_rfc6979 algo16 argument emulation. 70d4640 Make secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create skip processing invalid secret keys. 6c476a8 Minor comment improvements. 131afe5 Merge pull request #334 0c6ab2f Introduce explicit lower-S normalization fea19e7 Add contrib/lax_der_parsing.h 3bb9c44 Rewrite ECDSA signature parsing code fa57f1b Use secp256k1_rand_int and secp256k1_rand_bits more 49b3749 Add new tests for the extra testrand functions f684d7d Faster secp256k1_rand_int implementation 251b1a6 Improve testrand: add extra random functions 31994c8 Merge pull request #338 f79aa88 Bugfix: swap arguments to noncefp c98df26 Merge pull request #319 67f7da4 Extensive interface and operations tests for secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. ee2cb40 Add ARG_CHECKs to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse/secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize 7450ef1 Merge pull request #328 68a3c76 Merge pull request #329 98135ee Merge pull request #332 37100d7 improve ECDH header-doc b13d749 Fix couple of typos in API comments 7c823e3 travis: fixup module configs cc3141a Merge pull request #325 ee58fae Merge pull request #326 213aa67 Do not force benchmarks to be statically linked. 338fc8b Add API exports to secp256k1_nonce_function_default and secp256k1_nonce_function_rfc6979. 52fd03f Merge pull request #320 9f6993f Remove some dead code. 357f8cd Merge pull request #314 118cd82 Use explicit symbol visibility. 4e64608 Include public module headers when compiling modules. 1f41437 Merge pull request #316 fe0d463 Merge pull request #317 cfe0ed9 Fix miscellaneous style nits that irritate overactive static analysis. 2b199de Use the explicit NULL macro for pointer comparisons. 9e90516 Merge pull request #294 dd891e0 Get rid of _t as it is POSIX reserved 201819b Merge pull request #313 912f203 Eliminate a few unbraced statements that crept into the code. eeab823 Merge pull request #299 486b9bb Use a flags bitfield for compressed option to secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_privkey_export 05732c5 Callback data: Accept pointers to either const or non-const data 1973c73 Bugfix: Reinitialise buffer lengths that have been used as outputs 788038d Use size_t for lengths (at least in external API) c9d7c2a secp256k1_context_set_{error,illegal}_callback: Restore default handler by passing NULL as function argument 9aac008 secp256k1_context_destroy: Allow NULL argument as a no-op 64b730b secp256k1_context_create: Use unsigned type for flags bitfield cb04ab5 Merge pull request #309 a551669 Merge pull request #295 81e45ff Update group_impl.h 85e3a2c Merge pull request #112 b2eb63b Merge pull request #293 dc0ce9f [API BREAK] Change argument order to out/outin/in 6d947ca Merge pull request #298 c822693 Merge pull request #301 6d04350 Merge pull request #303 7ab311c Merge pull request #304 5fb3229 Fixes a bug where bench_sign would fail due to passing in too small a buffer. 263dcbc remove unused assignment b183b41 bugfix: "ARG_CHECK(ctx != NULL)" makes no sense 6da1446 build: fix parallel build 5eb4356 Merge pull request #291 c996d53 Print success 9f443be Move pubkey recovery code to separate module d49abbd Separate ECDSA recovery tests 439d34a Separate recoverable and normal signatures a7b046e Merge pull request #289 f66907f Improve/reformat API documentation secp256k1.h 2f77487 Add context building benchmarks cc623d5 Merge pull request #287 de7e398 small typo fix 9d96e36 Merge pull request #280 432e1ce Merge pull request #283 14727fd Use correct name in gitignore 356b0e9 Actually test static precomputation in Travis ff3a5df Merge pull request #284 2587208 Merge pull request #212 a5a66c7 Add support for custom EC-Schnorr-SHA256 signatures d84a378 Merge pull request #252 72ae443 Improve perf. of cmov-based table lookup 92e53fc Implement endomorphism optimization for secp256k1_ecmult_const ed35d43 Make `secp256k1_scalar_add_bit` conditional; make `secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda_var` constant time 91c0ce9 Add benchmarks for ECDH and const-time multiplication 0739bbb Add ECDH module which works by hashing the output of ecmult_const 4401500 Add constant-time multiply `secp256k1_ecmult_const` for ECDH e4ce393 build: fix hard-coded usage of "gen_context" b8e39ac build: don't use BUILT_SOURCES for the static context header baa75da tests: add a couple tests ae4f0c6 Merge pull request #278 995c548 Introduce callback functions for dealing with errors. c333074 Merge pull request #282 18c329c Remove the internal secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_t type 74a2acd Add a secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_t type 23cfa91 Introduce secp256k1_pubkey_t type 4c63780 Merge pull request #269 3e6f1e2 Change rfc6979 implementation to be a generic PRNG ed5334a Update configure.ac to make it build on OpenBSD 1b68366 Merge pull request #274 a83bb48 Make ecmult static precomputation default 166b32f Merge pull request #276 c37812f Add gen_context src/ecmult_static_context.h to CLEANFILES to fix distclean. 125c15d Merge pull request #275 76f6769 Fix build with static ecmult altroot and make dist. 5133f78 Merge pull request #254 b0a60e6 Merge pull request #258 733c1e6 Add travis build to test the static context. fbecc38 Add ability to use a statically generated ecmult context. 4fb174d Merge pull request #263 4ab8990 Merge pull request #270 bdf0e0c Merge pull request #271 31d0c1f Merge pull request #273 eb2c8ff Add missing casts to SECP256K1_FE_CONST_INNER 55399c2 Further performance improvements to _ecmult_wnaf 99fd963 Add secp256k1_ec_pubkey_compress(), with test similar to the related decompress() function. 145cc6e Improve performance of _ecmult_wnaf 36b305a Verify the result of GMP modular inverse using non-GMP code 0cbc860 Merge pull request #266 06ff7fe Merge pull request #267 5a43124 Save 1 _fe_negate since s1 == -s2 a5d796e Update code comments 3f3964e Add specific VERIFY tests for _fe_cmov 7d054cd Refactor to save a _fe_negate b28d02a Refactor to remove a local var 55e7fc3 Perf. improvement in _gej_add_ge a0601cd Fix VERIFY calculations in _fe_cmov methods 17f7148 Merge pull request #261 7657420 Add tests for adding P+Q with P.x!=Q.x and P.y=-Q.y 8c5d5f7 tests: Add failing unit test for #257 (bad addition formula) 5de4c5d gej_add_ge: fix degenerate case when computing P + (-lambda)P bcf2fcf gej_add_ge: rearrange algebra e2a07c7 Fix compilation with C++ 873a453 Merge pull request #250 91eb0da Merge pull request #247 210ffed Use separate in and out pointers in `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_decompress` a1d5ae1 Tiny optimization 729badf Merge pull request #210 2d5a186 Apply effective-affine trick to precomp 4f9791a Effective affine addition in EC multiplication 2b4cf41 Use pkg-config always when possible, with failover to manual checks for libcrypto git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1 git-subtree-split: 2bfb82b10edf0f0b0e366a12f94c8b21a914159d
457 lines
14 KiB
C
457 lines
14 KiB
C
/**********************************************************************
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille *
|
|
* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
|
|
* file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
|
|
**********************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H_
|
|
#define _SECP256K1_FIELD_REPR_IMPL_H_
|
|
|
|
#if defined HAVE_CONFIG_H
|
|
#include "libsecp256k1-config.h"
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include "util.h"
|
|
#include "num.h"
|
|
#include "field.h"
|
|
|
|
#if defined(USE_ASM_X86_64)
|
|
#include "field_5x52_asm_impl.h"
|
|
#else
|
|
#include "field_5x52_int128_impl.h"
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/** Implements arithmetic modulo FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE FFFFFC2F,
|
|
* represented as 5 uint64_t's in base 2^52. The values are allowed to contain >52 each. In particular,
|
|
* each FieldElem has a 'magnitude' associated with it. Internally, a magnitude M means each element
|
|
* is at most M*(2^53-1), except the most significant one, which is limited to M*(2^49-1). All operations
|
|
* accept any input with magnitude at most M, and have different rules for propagating magnitude to their
|
|
* output.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_verify(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
const uint64_t *d = a->n;
|
|
int m = a->normalized ? 1 : 2 * a->magnitude, r = 1;
|
|
/* secp256k1 'p' value defined in "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1. */
|
|
r &= (d[0] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m);
|
|
r &= (d[1] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m);
|
|
r &= (d[2] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m);
|
|
r &= (d[3] <= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m);
|
|
r &= (d[4] <= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL * m);
|
|
r &= (a->magnitude >= 0);
|
|
r &= (a->magnitude <= 2048);
|
|
if (a->normalized) {
|
|
r &= (a->magnitude <= 1);
|
|
if (r && (d[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) && ((d[3] & d[2] & d[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)) {
|
|
r &= (d[0] < 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(r == 1);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_verify(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
(void)a;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_normalize(secp256k1_fe *r) {
|
|
uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4];
|
|
|
|
/* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */
|
|
uint64_t m;
|
|
uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */
|
|
t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m = t1;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t2;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t3;
|
|
|
|
/* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0);
|
|
|
|
/* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */
|
|
x = (t4 >> 48) | ((t4 == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (m == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)
|
|
& (t0 >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL));
|
|
|
|
/* Apply the final reduction (for constant-time behaviour, we do it always) */
|
|
t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* If t4 didn't carry to bit 48 already, then it should have after any final reduction */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 48 == x);
|
|
|
|
/* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */
|
|
t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 1;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(secp256k1_fe *r) {
|
|
uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4];
|
|
|
|
/* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */
|
|
uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */
|
|
t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0);
|
|
|
|
r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(secp256k1_fe *r) {
|
|
uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4];
|
|
|
|
/* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */
|
|
uint64_t m;
|
|
uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */
|
|
t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m = t1;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t2;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; m &= t3;
|
|
|
|
/* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0);
|
|
|
|
/* At most a single final reduction is needed; check if the value is >= the field characteristic */
|
|
x = (t4 >> 48) | ((t4 == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & (m == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)
|
|
& (t0 >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL));
|
|
|
|
if (x) {
|
|
t0 += 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* If t4 didn't carry to bit 48 already, then it should have after any final reduction */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 48 == x);
|
|
|
|
/* Mask off the possible multiple of 2^256 from the final reduction */
|
|
t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r->n[0] = t0; r->n[1] = t1; r->n[2] = t2; r->n[3] = t3; r->n[4] = t4;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 1;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(secp256k1_fe *r) {
|
|
uint64_t t0 = r->n[0], t1 = r->n[1], t2 = r->n[2], t3 = r->n[3], t4 = r->n[4];
|
|
|
|
/* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */
|
|
uint64_t z0, z1;
|
|
|
|
/* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */
|
|
uint64_t x = t4 >> 48; t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
/* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */
|
|
t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52); t0 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 = t0; z1 = t0 ^ 0x1000003D0ULL;
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3;
|
|
z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4 ^ 0xF000000000000ULL;
|
|
|
|
/* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0);
|
|
|
|
return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(secp256k1_fe *r) {
|
|
uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4;
|
|
uint64_t z0, z1;
|
|
uint64_t x;
|
|
|
|
t0 = r->n[0];
|
|
t4 = r->n[4];
|
|
|
|
/* Reduce t4 at the start so there will be at most a single carry from the first pass */
|
|
x = t4 >> 48;
|
|
|
|
/* The first pass ensures the magnitude is 1, ... */
|
|
t0 += x * 0x1000003D1ULL;
|
|
|
|
/* z0 tracks a possible raw value of 0, z1 tracks a possible raw value of P */
|
|
z0 = t0 & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
z1 = z0 ^ 0x1000003D0ULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Fast return path should catch the majority of cases */
|
|
if ((z0 != 0ULL) & (z1 != 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t1 = r->n[1];
|
|
t2 = r->n[2];
|
|
t3 = r->n[3];
|
|
|
|
t4 &= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
|
|
t1 += (t0 >> 52);
|
|
t2 += (t1 >> 52); t1 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t1; z1 &= t1;
|
|
t3 += (t2 >> 52); t2 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t2; z1 &= t2;
|
|
t4 += (t3 >> 52); t3 &= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL; z0 |= t3; z1 &= t3;
|
|
z0 |= t4; z1 &= t4 ^ 0xF000000000000ULL;
|
|
|
|
/* ... except for a possible carry at bit 48 of t4 (i.e. bit 256 of the field element) */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(t4 >> 49 == 0);
|
|
|
|
return (z0 == 0) | (z1 == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) {
|
|
r->n[0] = a;
|
|
r->n[1] = r->n[2] = r->n[3] = r->n[4] = 0;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 1;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
const uint64_t *t = a->n;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3] | t[4]) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return a->n[0] & 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
a->magnitude = 0;
|
|
a->normalized = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (i=0; i<5; i++) {
|
|
a->n[i] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized);
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(b->normalized);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(b);
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (i = 4; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
if (a->n[i] > b->n[i]) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (a->n[i] < b->n[i]) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int secp256k1_fe_set_b32(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
r->n[0] = r->n[1] = r->n[2] = r->n[3] = r->n[4] = 0;
|
|
for (i=0; i<32; i++) {
|
|
int j;
|
|
for (j=0; j<2; j++) {
|
|
int limb = (8*i+4*j)/52;
|
|
int shift = (8*i+4*j)%52;
|
|
r->n[limb] |= (uint64_t)((a[31-i] >> (4*j)) & 0xF) << shift;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (r->n[4] == 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL && (r->n[3] & r->n[2] & r->n[1]) == 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL && r->n[0] >= 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 1;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Convert a field element to a 32-byte big endian value. Requires the input to be normalized */
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_get_b32(unsigned char *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (i=0; i<32; i++) {
|
|
int j;
|
|
int c = 0;
|
|
for (j=0; j<2; j++) {
|
|
int limb = (8*i+4*j)/52;
|
|
int shift = (8*i+4*j)%52;
|
|
c |= ((a->n[limb] >> shift) & 0xF) << (4 * j);
|
|
}
|
|
r[31-i] = c;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_negate(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int m) {
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= m);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
r->n[0] = 0xFFFFEFFFFFC2FULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[0];
|
|
r->n[1] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[1];
|
|
r->n[2] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[2];
|
|
r->n[3] = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[3];
|
|
r->n[4] = 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFULL * 2 * (m + 1) - a->n[4];
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = m + 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 0;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_mul_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) {
|
|
r->n[0] *= a;
|
|
r->n[1] *= a;
|
|
r->n[2] *= a;
|
|
r->n[3] *= a;
|
|
r->n[4] *= a;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude *= a;
|
|
r->normalized = 0;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_add(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
r->n[0] += a->n[0];
|
|
r->n[1] += a->n[1];
|
|
r->n[2] += a->n[2];
|
|
r->n[3] += a->n[3];
|
|
r->n[4] += a->n[4];
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude += a->magnitude;
|
|
r->normalized = 0;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_mul(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe * SECP256K1_RESTRICT b) {
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8);
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(b->magnitude <= 8);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(b);
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(r != b);
|
|
#endif
|
|
secp256k1_fe_mul_inner(r->n, a->n, b->n);
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 0;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_sqr(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->magnitude <= 8);
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
secp256k1_fe_sqr_inner(r->n, a->n);
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 0;
|
|
secp256k1_fe_verify(r);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_cmov(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe *a, int flag) {
|
|
uint64_t mask0, mask1;
|
|
mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0);
|
|
mask1 = ~mask0;
|
|
r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[4] = (r->n[4] & mask0) | (a->n[4] & mask1);
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
if (a->magnitude > r->magnitude) {
|
|
r->magnitude = a->magnitude;
|
|
}
|
|
r->normalized &= a->normalized;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a, int flag) {
|
|
uint64_t mask0, mask1;
|
|
mask0 = flag + ~((uint64_t)0);
|
|
mask1 = ~mask0;
|
|
r->n[0] = (r->n[0] & mask0) | (a->n[0] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[1] = (r->n[1] & mask0) | (a->n[1] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[2] = (r->n[2] & mask0) | (a->n[2] & mask1);
|
|
r->n[3] = (r->n[3] & mask0) | (a->n[3] & mask1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void secp256k1_fe_to_storage(secp256k1_fe_storage *r, const secp256k1_fe *a) {
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(a->normalized);
|
|
#endif
|
|
r->n[0] = a->n[0] | a->n[1] << 52;
|
|
r->n[1] = a->n[1] >> 12 | a->n[2] << 40;
|
|
r->n[2] = a->n[2] >> 24 | a->n[3] << 28;
|
|
r->n[3] = a->n[3] >> 36 | a->n[4] << 16;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_fe_from_storage(secp256k1_fe *r, const secp256k1_fe_storage *a) {
|
|
r->n[0] = a->n[0] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
|
|
r->n[1] = a->n[0] >> 52 | ((a->n[1] << 12) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
r->n[2] = a->n[1] >> 40 | ((a->n[2] << 24) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
r->n[3] = a->n[2] >> 28 | ((a->n[3] << 36) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
|
|
r->n[4] = a->n[3] >> 16;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
r->magnitude = 1;
|
|
r->normalized = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|